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The aim of this paper is to inquire into the possible relation between
the FTAA (Free Trade Area of Americas) and the progressive interna-
tionalization of the Euro. We will sustain that the actual productive
situation (globalization) makes impossible to think of an FTAA with-
out a kind of dollarisation of the Latin American countries (LAC). In
fact we argue, helped by empirical analysis, that an economic area can
use a sound currency if, and only if, it has a strong link with its issuing
country. That is why we analyze, with the principal component anal-
ysis, the economic situation of the LAC focusing on their dependence
on the U.S. and E.U. economies. We obtain that the LAC, candi-
dates for FTAA, are much more dependent from E.U. rather than
U.S.; moreover, the future evolution of the banking assets, in relation
to external and internal debt, could strengthen this dependence. For
these reasons we conclude that the FTAA process could meet some
diﬃculties in the next years, because the LAC economies could prefer
to use the Euro as the reference currency for international trade.
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11 Introduction
The aim of the paper is to discuss the capability of the diﬀusion and the
internationalization of the Euro to displace the FTAA (Free Trade Area of
Americas) implementation.
The FTAA project is focused on the creation of a free trade and free
investment area from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, including, in this way, all
the American countries, except for Cuba. Clearly, the FTAA would be an
extension of the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), created
in 1994 between U.S., Mexico and Canada, to the other LAC and to the
Caribbean ones too.
Many works investigated on the LAC sustainability of this agreement,
as in Rojas-Suarez (2002), Iglesias (2001), Schott (2001) e Pastor (2001);
each analysis has not considered the recent Euro’s introduction and its rapid
diﬀusion. From a diﬀerent perspective, the CEPAL [Economic commission
for the Latin American countries] (2003a) highlighted that the emergence
of a new strong currency, as the Euro, could create a new scenario for the
whole Latin American economy. One of the most relievable conclusions,
obtained using the principal component analysis, is that the Latin American
economic area, diﬀering from other areas of developing countries, shows a
high level of dependency on the U.S. economy; moreover this paper underlines
the possibility that this situation might change specially because the new
currency has the potentiality to alter this consolidated equilibrium.
In the section 2, we analyze the internationalization of the European cur-
rency in relation to the actual productive structure dominated by the concept
of globalization. In the section 3 we inquire on the eventual relation between
the dollarization and the FTAA; then, in the section 4, using the principal
component analysis (PCA), we describe the actual economic situation of the
LAC economies; ﬁnally, the section 5 deals with the banking sector of the
LAC and the eventual perspectives.
2 Euro-Dollar, Almost a Currency Duopoly
The international economic scenario shows a deep transformation since
1999, year of the birth of the Euro, causing the deﬁnitive economic and politic
integration of the E.U. countries. Many works, as Portes and Rey (1998) and
McCauley (1997), highlight how the progressive internationalization of the
2new European currency can gradually create new monetary scenarios, in-
volving the globalisation process on the production and the ﬁnancial level.
We agree with Portes and Rey (1998) and we argue that the principal rea-
son making a currency international depends on the costs reduction of the
international capital (FDI and portfolio investments) and goods trade. Al-
ogoskouﬁs and Portes (1997) estimate the international transaction costs,
between countries with low volatility currencies1, as 0,04%2. Nevertheless,
it is just a little lower than a half of the Tobin Tax. Toussaint (1998) ar-
gues that this tax, applied only on international portfolio investments, could
guarantee a ﬁscal drag of 50 billion dollars every year; but the transaction
costs, as Alogoskouﬁs and Portes have calculated, have to be applied to the
whole of the international relations, including capitals, goods and services.
Moreover, B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e (1998) notes that this estimation is valid for the
transactions between sound currency countries, or between those with partial
or complete peg these currencies. If exists a high degree of volatility, these
costs grow more and more.
The globalisation generates a new costs structure, because of the deﬁnitive
creation of a global market. The great costs structure complexity generates
the actual world economic scenario: in fact it has characterized by productive
and ﬁnancial big ‘ﬁli` eres’. They always cross themselves, involving in this
process almost each country in every continents, generating a considerable
number of transactions between diﬀerent countries every day. The outsourc-
ing (as the FDI) increases drammatically every year (Unctad 2003) as the
portfolio investments ﬂow; for these reasons the international trade of goods
and capital becomes, probably, the most important variable. That is why
we can sustain, as Portes and Rey (1998), that the global market is creating
a new structure in which the relations between regional blocks (European
Union, Africa, Middle-East, Japan-Southeast of Asia, North America, Latin
America) are more important than those between single countries. Conse-
quently, we argue that it should be optimal to reduce as much as possible,
the number of currencies with the aim of the ﬁrm cost minimization; conse-
quently we argue the optimal condition is to use only one of those as in De
Cecco (1971) on McKinnon (1969). At the same time, it is clear that the
emergence of the new European currency has gone in the other direction of
the optimal one (in the sense of Optimal Currency Areas classical theory).
1The analysis was made on the old currencies of Europe in 1997 and the Usd;
2The European Commission (1990) estimation was 0,035%;
3This process has produced a reduction of the international currencies remov-
ing the old European ones; on the other side, its emergence was the birth
of a real concurrent of the U.S. dollar, as in BIS Quarterly Review (2004).
It shows, in fact, that the the exceptional issue of bonds by residents in the
Euro area was the principal reason for the amount of 460,4 billions of Usd
of international debt bonds issued in all the world in the fourth trimester of
2003. The sum of the European bonds, in fact, was exactly the half of the
total, and it was two times bigger than the same trimester of 2002; the sum
in 2003 (834 billions of USD), was bigger of 60% than the previous year. On
the other hand, the bonds issued by U.S. residents (in USD), in the same
period, amounted at 150 billions of dollars increasing only by 10% from the
2002. Another observation can conﬁrm the process of internationalization of
the Euro: the North American issues of bonds in Euro increased by 30%,
staying, nevertheless, much under the amount of bonds issued in USD that
decreased by 27% compared with the year before.
3 The Ftaa and The Dollar: Empirical Eval-
uations
We sustain that the American economic integration process (FTAA) has
to proceed with a kind of peg to dollar3 (or dollarisation) of the economies
of LAC countries4, where the experience of the The Plan de convertibilidad
(1999) of Argentina, that previewed a currency board between the Argen-
tinean currency (initially the Austral, then the Peso) and the USD and after,
on 2000, the complete dollarization of Ecuador are the ‘parents’ of a lati-
namerican dollar-currency area5. Empirical studies conﬁrm this intuition.
Cepal (2003a), for example, analyzes the correlation coeﬃcients between in-
3In this section we will not talk about the IMSA (International monetary stability act)
proposed by the U.S. senator Connie Mack in 1999, that, substantially talks about the
possibility of every developing country of dollarize itself, talking about, rhetorically of
the great advantages that a dollarized country could have. The reference to the South
American countries is clear, as the same Connie Mack said in more than one occasion.
That is why we we talk about Ftaa, don’t forgetting the parallel process of IMSA;
4See also Nakatani (2004)
5Moreover, the rate of dollarization, not oﬃcial, of the other countries on the Latin
american sub-continent is very high;
4Table 1: Correlation between prevalent external trade partners and currency
peg
Currency peg USD EURO




ternational trade and peg to sound currencies as in table ??6 and conﬁrms
our analysis.
From Table ??, We can observe a positive correlation between the preva-
lent external trade (import and export) partner of 93 developing countries
and the predisposition to peg to its currency. Moreover, we observe that the
cross correlation coeﬃcient between the prevalent partner and the currency
peg is negative if the latter is U.S. and the former is Euro and vice versa as
in table ??. This result conﬁrms another time what we argued: therefore, if
a country is dependent on external trade from one of the two ‘blocks’, it will
peg itself to the currency of the block or, at least, it will use it as the refer-
ence currency for the external trade. Since we are talking about correlation
coeﬃcients we can revert this observation: if a developing country will peg
or will use as referent a sound currency, it will choose, as prevalent partner
of external trade, the country that issues it.
From the same study, we can get out another indication: the denomina-
tion of external debt is able to determine the propensity to peg to a sound
currency and vice versa. As before, the cross correlation coeﬃcients are
negative7.
Consequently we don’t repute suﬃcient talk about the applicability of
the FTAA, watching only at ﬁnancial or real indicators of every single LAC
economy. It is important analyzing these structures focusing, in particular,
6The link between trade openness and currency peg is one of the parameters of the clas-
sical Optimal Currency Areas theory [Mundell (1961), Kenen (1969), McKinnon (1963)]
as reported in Hughes Hallet and Anthony (2003);
7Dooley, Lizondo and Mathieson (1989), Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000) conﬁrm
these results observing a dependence of the currency used for international trade from the
denomination of external debt and the loans payed for, passing through the international
reserves;
5on the relation with the dependence of every single LAC country from the
two economic and currency blocks (U.S. and EU), deducing the perspectives.
4 The actual situation in Latin America
In this section, we will use the multidimensional statistical analysis of
principal components8 to observe which is the actual situation of the LAC,
in relation to the degree of dependence from U.S. and EU. The data set (Table
2) contains the 19 biggest countries of LAC, in relation to the variables that
describe the external dependence:
1. Import from U.S. and EU;
2. Export to U.S. and EU;
3. Foreign direct investments coming from residents in U.S. and in EU;
4. Financial activities of U.S. an EU banks that work in LAC countries;
5. The currency used to denominate the external debt;
In order to obtain an analysis that considers the relative weight of the
diﬀerent economies, we use, as variable, the relative weight of GDP. Every
data represent the incidence of the single variable on the total, for every
country. With the PCA, we have been able to synthesize all the informations
given by table ??, on three principal factors9:
From table ??, we deduce that 60% of the total variability is explained
by the ﬁrst and the second axis. Then, we analyze only the graphic with the
scatter and the correlation circle on the ﬁrst two axes (Figure??): Axis 1
has to be considered as the dependence degree of the single country from the
U.S. (positive part) and from the EU (negative part). On the other hand,
axis 2 seems to be inﬂuenced more from the Gdp variable than form the FDI
one. Therefore we consider only the informations that the countries sitting
in a position very far from the zero of the axis 2 give because the variability
8Dunteman, G.H. (1989), Principal component analysis, Sage University Paper series
on Quantitative Applications in Social Science, 07-069, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications;
Lebart, L., A. Morineau, and M. Piron (1995), Statistique exploratoire multidimesionelle,
Paris, Dunod; S.Bolasco, Analisi Multidimensionale dei dati, Carocci 1999;
9The outputs are in table ??;



























Argentina 7,91 20,41 14,62 29,46 16,21 57,77 64,1 11,3 11,91 64 12
Bolivia 22,95 17,35 23,64 17,35 18,18 71,79 46,9 9,5 0,66 34 20
Brasile 19,35 22,98 24,58 27,05 21,23 44,9 70,8 4,3 35,83 22 36
Chile 16,41 24,92 24,03 21,11 16,55 57,15 83,2 1,7 4,41 39 39
Colombia 38,32 34,98 24,23 19,14 20,59 47,17 77,6 2,6 6,65 9 31
Costa Rica 48,37 45,88 21,26 11,08 30,37 28,98 72,3 0,7 0,65 62 9
Ecuador 36,53 31,08 20,12 16,37 33,37 36,31 83 2 1,28 58 12
El Salvador 57,6 42,08 15,03 9,46 38,39 30,04 68,3 4,7 0,81 36,3 16,5
Guatemala 52,08 44,85 11,42 10,58 51,18 25,79 75,3 4,4 1,30 70 20
Haiti 87,07 59,64 10,54 10,68 27,96 50,54 80,6 2,3 0,38 80 0
Honduras 38,55 49,32 21,72 10,52 34,65 37,91 62,9 4,2 0,37 78 0
Jamaica 39,82 51,55 27,81 10,95 24,7 18,03 57,7 2,5 0,28 98 0
Mexico 87,92 75,14 3,33 8,96 23,85 48,01 77,3 5,4 24,94 66 22
Nicaragua 45,21 32,11 16,54 10,19 29,05 52,7 70,6 7,6 0,26 95 0
Paraguay 2,66 11,86 21,58 10,63 6,74 74,59 46,6 5,1 3,44 35,1 22,35
Peru 33,54 25,76 21,55 17,88 9,71 75,5 72,6 4,1 0,75 8,4 34,4
Trin-
Tobago
37,84 43,59 15,57 18,03 11,86 47,03 61 0,8 0,42 100 0
Uruguay 5,78 11,14 16 20,07 16,56 65,9 76,8 4,1 0,93 62,9 10,2
Venezuela 47,28 43,65 7,63 17,94 21,18 50,31 80,4 7,9 4,54 25 19
Source: Cepal (2000a), Cepal (2003b), Unctad 2003


































Export EU -0,589 -0,501 1
Import EU -0,621 -0,583 0,228 1
Banking
Assets Usa
0,516 0,475 -0,237 -0,482 1
Banking
Assets EU
-0,452 -0,605 0,011 0,364 -0,759 1
External
Debt in $
0,394 0,297 -0,377 0,096 0,311 -0,216 1
External
Debt in
-0,22 -0,294 -0,266 0,272 -0,117 0,403 -0,329 1
Gdp
Weight
0,011 0,067 -0,121 0,419 -0,141 0,025 0,127 0,173 1
Fdi U.S. 0,281 0,425 -0,213 -0,381 0,302 -0,426 -0,111 -0,15 -0,272 1



























Source: Elaboration with the software MVSP, database Tab.2
8Table 4: Eigenvalues
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3
Eigenvalues 4,306 2,042 1,468
Percentage 39,145 18,568 13,347
Cum. Percentage 39,145 57,713 71,060
Source: Elaboration with the software MVSP, database Tab.2
Table 5: PCA variable loadings
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3
Export U.S. 0,402 0,257 -0,132
Import U.S. 0,418 0,193 -0,073
Export EU -0,22 -0,291 0,565
Import EU -0,352 0,169 0,003
Banking Assets Usa 0,349 0,081 0,139
Banking Assets EU -0,354 -0,021 -0,338
External Debt in $ 0,14 0,489 0,185
External Debt in EUR -0,168 -0,016 -0,643
Gdp Weight -0,115 0,457 -0,114
Fdi U.S. 0,309 -0,358 -0,15
Fdi EU -0,295 0,447 0,203
Source: Elaboration with the software MVSP, database Tab.2
9Table 6: PCA care scores
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3
Argentina -0,568 -0,065 -0,506
Bolivia -0,602 -0,362 -0,276
Brasile -0,638 0,533 0,227
Chile -0,46 0,238 0,409
Colombia -0,275 0,305 0,365
Costa Rica 0,411 -0,095 0,346
Ecuador 0,184 0,038 0,315
El Salvador 0,38 0,079 0,06
Guatemala 0,596 0,151 0,064
Haiti 0,709 0,098 -0,158
Honduras 0,396 -0,342 0,06
Jamaica 0,443 -0,518 0,292
Mexico 0,59 0,661 -0,471
Nicaragua 0,27 -0,307 -0,296
Paraguay -0,666 -0,423 -0,104
Peru -0,574 0,168 0,086
Trin-Tobago 0,183 -0,367 -0,027
Uruguay -0,376 -0,166 -0,049
Venezuela -0,003 0,373 -0,337
Source: Elaboration with the software MVSP, database Tab.2
10Figure 1: Correlation Circle and the scatter
Source: Elaboration with the software SPAD4.5
11explained by this axis is very low (18%). We analyze, at this step of the
work, the single condition of every country in relation to these variables:
1. In regard to axis 1, the Central American and the Caribbean coun-
tries appear very dependent from the North American economy; in
this group we want to underline the position of Mexico - in the Nafta
from 1994 - the one of Venezuela that is very close to zero - this country
is one of the best petroleum partners of the U.S., and this, presumably,
is the reason why it has not in the same position of the other South
American countries - and the one of Ecuador, the only LAC econ-
omy totally dollarized from 2000. The South American countries, on
the other hand, stay on the negative part of the axis 1, showing their
strong dependence from the European economies.
2. The axis 2, divides in the positive part the biggest countries, and in
the negative part the smaller ones, although the eﬀect is inﬂuenced by
the FDI.
Clearly, the ‘point of view’ showed by the axis 1 is very important for the
aim of our analysis. The discribed is clear enough: actually the economics of
the candidate countries to the FTAA (as an extension of NAFTA) show that
the most inﬂuent and big countries are linked to the E.U. economy. This
result involves that they should naturally be more inclined to use the Euro
although nowadays, as we said, it has not developed all its potentialities as
international currency. In fact what might happen if the internationalization
process of the Euro will grow rapidly inﬂuencing, naturally, the external debt
structure of the LAC countries?
To ﬁnd an answer, we are going to analyze other multidimensional graphs,
coming from the same principal component analysis, and we show the relative
weight of external debt in Usd (ﬁg.2) and of the bank assets of U.S. and E.U.
for each country. In ﬁgure ?? we can observe that the relative weight of
external debt in Usd is more or less the same for every country and, as it can
be seen from table ??, it is very high: in fact the dimension of each bubble
measures the percental weight of the variable for the country. Probabily it
is a consequence of the historical evolution of the international monetary
system. In fact after the death of the British Pound as an international
currency, it was totally hegemonized by the U.S. dollar (Usd) as the most
reliable currency for the developing countries’ external debt, even after the
end of the Bretton Woods agreement. That gives a lot of importance to the
12Figure 2: The relative weight of the external debt in Usd
Source: Elaboration with the software SPAD 4.5
13analysis of the diﬀerent relative weight of the bank assets of U.S. and U.E.
banks. On the other hand, the bank assets, as in ﬁgure ?? and ??, show
that the most dependent countries from the U.E. have a big relative weight
of bank assets of European banks and the most dependent countries from
the U.S. have a big relative weight of bank assets of U.S. banks10.
5 The Latin American Banking sector
The enormous ﬂow of FDI in the decade of 90s in the LAC countries in-
terested, particularly, the banking sector; it was characterized especially by
the acquisition of national banks by foreign ones (process of centralization).
It is important to see how these foreign banks entered the LAC economy
and began to grow reaching the actual enormous dimensions. One of the
most important reasons resided in the governmental role. For example, we
underline the case of Brazil. The Brazilian government, in 1996, follow-
ing the goal of reducing the amount of external debt accumulated since the
decade of the 70s, used the PROES, a program of incentives to restructure
the public ﬁnancial system of every state of the country, and started the
privatization of the most important banks of the state. By this way, which
other LAC countries followed in other forms, the government conﬁrmed its
radical intention to increase the operative eﬃciency of the banking sector,
increasing the competition, diversifying the ﬁnancial services supply and in-
troducing new ﬁnancial skills11. Clearly, this process was a part of the global
expansion of ﬁnancial capital. For example, a couple of years before (1992),
the Banco de Santander acquired the Midland, increasing its assets in one
year from 86 billion of English Pound to 170 billion, starting the process
that would reach the peak with the fusion with the Banco Central Hispanico
giving life to the actual enormous group BSCH. The year before, the ABN
(1991), acquired the Amro, becoming the most important Dutch banking
group and, after a couple of years, the Banco de Bilbao, after the fusion with
the Banco Vizacaya, acquired the Argentaria12, deﬁning in that way, a real
Spanish duopoly in the banking side.
10The situation seems to be suﬃciently clear: from the ﬁg.2, in fact, we can understand
that the relative weight of the external debt in Usd is more or less the same in all these
countries;
11cfr. Exposicion de motivos, n.11- Plan Real (Brasil)- 1995;
12An important Argentinean bank;
14Figure 3: The relative weight of the US Bank assets
Source: Elaboration with the software SPAD4.5
15Figure 4: The relative weight of the European Bank assets
Source: Elaboration with the software SPAD4.5]
16Table 7: Evolution Of The Stranger Banks Assets On The Total bank Assets




Source: Correa (2002), Cepal (2003a),(2000b)
The principal acquisitions in the last 15 years of the foreign ﬁnancial
capital in the LAC are notable, drawing the situation that shows table ??.
The Latin American banking sector is now clearly characterized by a notable
foreign presence that, by 1999, manages the 60% of the total internal loans
and the 50% of the total assets of the area (Salomon Smith Barley 1998). This
relevant part of the total assets is managed in 34% by the Bsch (Spain), 21,8%
by the Citibank (U.S.), 19,6% by the Bbva (Spain), 8,7% by the Bank of
Boston(U.S.), 9,15% by the Hsbc (U.K.),6,7% by the Abn-Amro (Holland)13.
The assets managed by european banks, that actually issue bonds in
Euro, in the LAC countries, are the 70%, against less than the 30% of the
Americans. These results become more important when we link this question
to the FTAA excluding the Mexico (member of the NAFTA). In fact we
observe that the relative weight of the foreign banks that issue bonds in
Euro is three times bigger than the U.S. ones. This weight can be felt also
in the Latin American bank association, where the absolute majority of the
directive places (55%) are occupied by these groups14, distributed in each
LAC country.
6 Conclusions
U.S. and a little group of LAC governments want that the FTAA will start
in 2005-2010; this process, unfortunately, is clearly in high contrast with the
actual economic condition of Latin America’s countries as we have seen in
this paper. In fact actually the FTAA could represent only a free trade
13Source: Cepal (2003b)
14Minella (2002);
17agreement between an area (North American) very developed, and another
one (LAC) generally underdeveloped with a high degree of dependence from
European economy more than the American.
Until today, as we argued, the European loans to private and public
institutions of the LAC countries were made in the ‘Eurodollar’ currency.
Today, there is no more reasons why the European banks should not have
to make loans in Euro; in fact, as we have seen in the previous sessions,
nowadays, they issue over the world bonds in Euro and, pointing at the
costs minimization, they would prefer to use the same currency for all the
transactions. Overall, the numerical presence of the E.U. banks is greater
than the U.S. ones. Consequently, a big part of the external debt might follow
the recent evolution of the banking sector in terms of currency, increasing the
existent gap between the integration of LAC with E.U. and with the U.S.;
moreover this condition involves the whole economy because of the economic
and political power of these groups. For example the Bsch owned the Respol
of Spain that, in the 1999, bought, in the most important privatization of
the Latin American history, the YPF, the enormous public ﬁrm of petroleum
production and extraction.
We conclude that the FTAA process is very diﬃcult. In fact, from the
point of view of the American corporations, that prevalently use the USD
for their transactions, as it is natural, the process of FTAA and the previous
dollarization (of any kind) is a great chance: nevertheless, this hypothetic
situation goes against the actual situation that shows that the European cap-
italists, that largerly use the Euro for their transactions, are more integrated
in the area; this could give life to a possible collusion between diﬀerent inter-
ests. On the other hand, for what we said in the previous sections, it could
appear more reasonable and ‘natural’ for the LAC to use the Euro as the
referent currency and, in particular for the Mercosur ones, to increase the
integration with E.U, process started some years ago.
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